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WILLFUL BLINDNESS, PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY, AND 
TIPPEE LIABILITY:  SAC, STEVEN COHEN, AND THE 
COURT’S OPINION IN DIRKS 	  
JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY*	  
The lengthy insider trading investigation involving SAC Capital Advisors, 
L.P. and certain of its affiliates (“SAC”), together with SAC’s prosecution 
emanating from that investigation, have been leading business stories in the news 
in recent months.  Despite settling civil charges with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), SAC has been indicted on insider trading charges.1    
Although SAC originally pleaded “not guilty” to those charges,2 SAC recently 
revised its plea to “guilty” and is awaiting judicial approval of the plea and related 
terms.3  SAC’s founder and owner, Steven A. Cohen (“Cohen”), manages and 
controls the trading activities of SAC4 but is not named as a defendant in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* W.P. Toms Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law; J.D., 
New York University School of Law; A.B., Brown University.  The original draft of this essay was 
prepared for use in a discussion group session convened at the Southeastern Association of Law 
Schools 2013 Annual Meeting.  I want to express my thanks to Jennifer Arlen and to the 
participants in that discussion group session (including John Anderson, Miriam Baer, Jill Fisch, 
Gerry Moohr, Donna Nagy, Ellen Podgor, Elizabeth Pollman, Charles Pouncy, and Jeanne 
Schroeder) for their insights and suggestions. 
1 See generally Indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. et al., 13 Crim. 541 
(S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July13/SACChargingAndSupportingDocuments
/SAC%20Indictment%20(Stamped).pdf; Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Director-In-
Charge Announce Insider Trading Charges Against Four SAC Capital Management Companies and SAC 
Portfolio Managers (July 25, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July13/SACPR.php. 
2 See Bernard Vaughan, SAC Capital pleads not guilty to insider-trading charges, REUTERS (July26, 2013, 
12:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/26/us-sac-fund-charges-
idUSBRE96O0SD20130726.  
3 See Peter Lattman & Ben Protess, SAC Capital Agrees to Plead Guilty to Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (November 4, 2013, 11:08 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/sac-
capital-agrees-to-plead-guilty-to-insider-trading/?_r=0.; Ben Protess, SAC Pleads Guilty, Then Judge 
Calls a Timeout, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (November 8, 2013, 8:37 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/sac-capital-pleads-guilty-then-judge-calls-a-timeout/. 
4 See Corrected Order Instituting Administrative Proceedings Pursuant to Section 203(f) of the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and Notice of Hearing, Steven A. Cohen Release No. IA-3634, 
2013 WL 3776681, at *1 (July 19, 2013), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/ia-3634.pdf (describing Cohen as “the founder and 
owner of hedge fund investment advisers that bear his initials (S.A.C.) and that until recently 
48 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15 
 
indictment.  The SEC has, however, brought administrative proceedings against 
Cohen for a failure to supervise employees who used material nonpublic 
information and allegedly illegally used that information in making trades for 
SAC.5 
Although the facts associated with the SAC insider trading allegations 
have not been firmly established, the scuttlebutt in the news is that Cohen has not 
been indicted or pursued in a public civil enforcement proceeding for insider 
trading violations because there is insufficient evidence that Cohen violated U.S. 
insider trading laws.6  The published facts do not indicate that Cohen is an actual 
or constructive insider of the firms about which information was received and 
possessed at the time SAC made trades in related securities.  Published facts also 
do not indicate that Cohen is an outsider who breached a duty of trust and 
confidence owed to the source of information possessed at the time of a related 
securities transaction.  Rather, Cohen allegedly received material nonpublic 
information from insiders in his firm—SAC—who had received that information 
improperly from others.7  These SAC insiders were in possession of the 
improperly obtained information when they engaged in securities trading related 
to that information—trades that were allegedly controlled and financed by 
Cohen.8  In other words, Cohen is a possible insider trading tippee (if he is, in 
fact, an insider trader at all). 
Tipper/tippee liability for insider trading in the United States is actionable 
under Rule 10b-5,9 adopted by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, as amended (the “1934 Act”).10  The basic framework for tippee liability 
under Rule 10b-5 was established in Dirks v. SEC, a Supreme Court case decided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
managed portfolios of over $15 billion” and stating that Cohen “founded, owns, and controls 
investment advisers whose names bear his initials, including S.A.C. Capital Advisors, LLC”). 
5 See generally id. 
6 See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld et al., SAC Capital’s Steven Cohen Expected to Avoid Criminal Charges, 
WALL ST. J., July 4, 2013 at C13, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323899704578585953480399358 
(reporting that “U.S. prosecutors have concluded that they don’t have enough evidence against 
hedge-fund billionaire Steven A. Cohen to file criminal insider-trading charges against him before 
a July deadline . . . .”). 
7 See Indictment, supra note 1. 
8 Id. 
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012). 
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thirty years ago.11  Under Dirks, a classical tippee is liable for insider trading if the 
tipper conveys material nonpublic information to him or her or it improperly—by 
breaching a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence to the 
shareholders of an issuer of securities.12  
[F]or Rule 10b-5 purposes, the insider’s disclosure is improper 
only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts duty.  Thus, a tippee 
assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not 
to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider 
has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing 
the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should 
know that there has been a breach.13	  
The Supreme Court cites to an opinion in an SEC administrative action for 
support:  “Tippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a 
necessary finding that the tippee knew the information was given to him in breach 
of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the 
information.”14   
Accordingly, under Dirks, a tippee may violate U.S. insider trading law 
when he or she trades on the basis of, or re-tips, information received directly or 
indirectly from an insider who breaches the requisite type of duty if the tippee 
knows or should have known of the breach.15  This means that a public or private 
enforcement agent alleging a tippee violation must effectively establish four 
essential things relative to the vital breach of duty component of an insider 
trading action: (1) the tipper’s duty of trust and confidence—a duty to disclose all 
material nonpublic information or abstain from trading in the issuer’s securities; 
(2) a breach of that duty; (3) the tippee’s knowledge of that duty; and (4) the 
tippee’s knowledge that the duty was breached in conveying the information.16  
This is a tall order.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
12 Id. at 660-61. 
13 Id. at 660. 
14 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661 (quoting In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971)). 
15 See id. 
16 See id. at 659-61. 
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Based on what we know today, what among these substantive elements 
relating to the essential breach of duty is troublesome in constructing an insider 
trading case against Cohen?  Although I am sure defense attorneys would attack 
the sufficiency of evidence with respect to each substantive element of the claim, 
I fixate on whether, given published facts about Cohen and the way in which SAC 
conducts its business, Cohen ever knew or should have known the origin of the 
information on which trades were based.  In other words, was Cohen aware that 
the people who shared information with Cohen’s employees—even if not with 
Cohen himself—breached duties of trust and confidence to corporate 
shareholders by sharing the information?  “Expert network” insider trading cases 
(legal actions alleging insider trading in securities trading firms built around 
interconnected relationships of industry and securities trading professionals—
expert networks—that receive and use information17) tend to raise this question.18  
SAC, as a firm, reportedly uses expert networks in its operations.19  Did Cohen 
know, or should he have known, the provenance of the information that 
supported SAC’s trading decisions and profits?20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Allyson Poulos et al., Securities Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1479, 1557-58 (2013) (“Recent 
insider trading prosecutions have also focused on the use of expert networks.  Expert networks 
are consulting firms that connect large investors with industry executives, often in the technology 
or healthcare industries.  These experts are paid to help money managers and investors understand 
a particular field.”). 
18 See Rita Glavin et al., The Expanding Scope of Insider Trading Liability, SEC’S LITIG. INSIGHTS 
(Winter 2011), available at 
http://www.velaw.com/resources/ExpandingScopeInsiderTradingLiability.aspx. 
Research analysts at investment firms may be unaware of whether the information they 
are researching and obtaining is material, let alone whether the information originated 
from a source that was obligated to keep the information confidential.  Likewise, 
investment professionals who rely on the information provided through the expert 
network firms—which can be several sources removed from the information—may be 
equally unaware about the source and import of the information.  They may also 
consider the information they receive from consultants to be immaterial, or they may rely 
on representations by the expert-network firm that the information to be shared by 
consultants does not violate any confidentiality duties. 
Id. 
19 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Knowledge Is Money, but the Peril Is Obvious, N.Y. TIME’S DEALBOOK 
(Nov. 26, 2012, 9:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/knowledge-is-money-but-
the-peril-is-obvious/.  
20 This same question is being asked about one of Cohen’s colleagues, Michael Steinberg, a 
portfolio manager at SAC.  See Christopher M. Matthews & James Sterngold,  High Stakes in Trial of 
SAC Manager, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2013, 7:56 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303789604579198010436644946 (“‘The 
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In terms of actual knowledge, SAC’s business model may have kept 
Cohen purposefully in the dark about the origins of information possessed by his 
analysts and traders.21  Information received by analysts in a securities trading firm 
may or may not be passed on to a principal of that firm in the same form in 
which it was received (since analysts are charged with synthesizing and otherwise 
processing information), and even if it is, facts about the source(s) of the 
information that would be relevant to insider trading liability may not be 
conveyed to the principal.  Cohen may have had no actual knowledge of any 
informant’s duty or breach of duty.   
This still leaves open the possibility, however, that Cohen should have 
known that the information relevant to the trade was received from an insider who 
breached a duty of trust and confidence in conveying the information.22  The 
content of this obligation or duty to know the origin of information and the 
circumstances in which the information is given and received is sketchy at best.  
But it is not a fait accompli that the law requires a trader to actually ask where 
information comes from.  Cohen’s portfolio managers and other employees were 
hired to ferret out information and suggest and make trades taking that 
information into account.  Can the principal of a securities trading business turn a 
blind eye to the methods used to acquire information used in the business, 
especially if he or she has reason to suspect that disclosure of the information was 
improper, or is there a duty to inquire under the Dirks Court’s legal standard? 
Under current U.S. Supreme Court opinions, a principal may be able to 
remain ignorant about the source of information used in trading on his or her or 
its behalf and avoid liability for insider trading.23  However, the opinion in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
central question,’ Mr. Berke wrote in a court filing, ‘is whether Mr. Steinberg knew that certain 
pieces of information provided by Mr. Horvath were obtained illegally.’”).  Steinberg was being 
tried for insider trading when work on this essay was completed. 
21 See Sorkin, supra note 19. 
22 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (“[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation 
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when . . . the tippee knows or should know that 
there has been a breach.” (emphasis added)). 
23 A recent federal district court opinion acknowledged this possibility, noting specifically that it 
may be difficult to prove that a remote tippee knew of the tipper’s breach of duty (shown by the 
receipt of a benefit by the tipper).  See U.S. v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“[O]ne can imagine cases where a remote tippee’s knowledge that the tipper was receiving some 
sort of benefit might be difficult to prove.  If, however, this is an unfortunate “loophole,” it is a 
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recent case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, SEC v. Obus, 24 
casts doubt on the ability of a securities trading firm principal to effectively avoid 
insider trading liability on that basis.  In Obus, the Second Circuit opined that a 
negligence standard guides the determination of whether an alleged tippee should 
have known that the conveyance of the information constituted a breach of 
fiduciary duty (making the conveyance “improper” and an appropriate basis for 
insider trading liability).  The Obus court noted that the assessment of what a 
tippee should have known involves “a fact-specific inquiry turning on the tippee’s 
own knowledge and sophistication, and on whether the tipper’s conduct raised 
red flags that confidential information was being transmitted improperly.”25  
Under a negligence standard, the receipt of specific kinds of information in 
certain factual contexts by an alleged secondary tippee like Cohen, who has 
significant knowledge and sophistication, is more likely to result in a 
determination that the secondary tippee should have known that the informant 
(tipper) breached a duty of trust and confidence by improperly conveying facts to 
an employee of the firm (primary tippee). 
As a general matter, however, insider trading liability, a form of securities 
fraud liability, requires scienter—an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud; 
negligence alone is insufficient as a basis for liability.26  Scienter may be based on 
reckless conduct as a form of intentional conduct.27  The Obus court, mindful of 
the precedential value of Ernst & Ernst, reconciles the tension between its 
negligence standard and the scienter standard in Ernst & Ernst28 by applying a 
negligence standard to the tippee’s knowledge of a breach of duty and a scienter-
based (knowledge or recklessness) standard to the tippee’s engagement in trading 
or re-tipping while in possession of material nonpublic information.  “Thus,” the 
Obus court rules, “tippee liability can be established if a tippee knew or had reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
product of the topsy-turvy way the law of insider trading has developed in the courts and cannot 
be cured short of legislation.”).  
24 SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012). 
25 Id. at 288. 
26 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfedler, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (“Although the extensive legislative 
history of the 1934 Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress’ intent, we think the 
relevant portions of that history support our conclusion that § 10(b) was addressed to practices 
that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct 
alone.”). 
27 Id. at 193 n.12.  
28 See Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 448 (describing the root of this tension in the Dirks Court’s use of 
“know or should have known” rather than a standard employing knowledge or recklessness). 
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to know that confidential information was initially obtained and transmitted 
improperly (and thus through deception), and if the tippee intentionally or 
recklessly traded while in knowing possession of that information.”29  A recent 
student-authored law review article appropriately questions whether this analytical 
separation is tenable in application, concluding that the Obus opinion, in effect, 
imposes a negligence standard on tippee liability (in contravention of the Court’s 
opinion in Dirks).30 
If the Ernst & Ernst opinion is to retain its original meaning, Obus cannot 
be right.  In Ernst & Ernst, the Court makes clear that it is concerned about more 
than intentional or reckless trading in ascertaining the appropriate state of mind 
for an insider trading violation under § 10(b).  At the heart of the Ernst & Ernst 
Court’s concern is the deceptive, manipulative, or fraudulent intent of the alleged 
violator.  “In this opinion,” the Court writes, “the term ‘scienter’ refers to a 
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Obus, 693 F.3d at 288; see also Langevoort, supra note 28, at 455-58.  
30 Allison M. Vissichelli, Intent to Reconcile: SEC v. Obus, The Second Circuit’s Edification of the Tippee 
Scienter Standard, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 776 (2013). 
[T]here is a degree of incongruity in the Second Circuit’s approach, as it would seem that 
a tippee, who only negligently knew of the tipper’s breach, could not then knowingly 
trade on the basis of improper information if the information is only made improper by 
the breach.  In other words, the negligence standard annuls the actual or reckless 
knowledge standard in that a tippee may knowingly or recklessly trade on information 
without knowing that the information is of the type of which the Act and accompanying 
Rule prohibit trading.  Such an effect would be contrary to insider trading regulation’s 
foundation in common law fraud and to its purpose of protecting the stability of the 
securities market. 
Id.  
31 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.  The Court expressly ducks the question of whether 
recklessness is sufficient to constitute the requisite intentional behavior: “In certain areas of the 
law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing 
liability for some act.  We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, 
reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”  Id.  Subsequent 
federal court decisions addressing the issue generally find recklessness sufficient as a standard of 
liability.  See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 1977); In 
re Intelligroup Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 262, 282 (D.N.J. 2007); American General Ins. Co. v. 
Equitable General Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 745 n.51 (E.D. Va. 1980).  The conception of 
recklessness varies from case to case, however.  See Langevoort, supra note 28, at 436-37. 
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In point of fact, conduct must be manipulative or deceptive in order to 
violate § 10(b).32  Accordingly, fraudulent conduct is only actionable under § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 if manipulative or deceptive.33  Insider trading violates § 10(b) 
because it is deceptive; the deception arises from the maintenance of silence in 
the face of a duty to disclose.34  One can intentionally or recklessly trade while in 
knowing possession of information obtained from a person who breaches a duty 
to shareholders or others without having the intent to deceive shareholders or an 
information source.35  Presumably, a person in Cohen’s position—the principal of 
a securities trading firm—obtains information directly and indirectly from a 
variety of sources before making a trading decision.  Who does Cohen deceive if 
he closes his eyes to the origin of some or all of the material nonpublic 
information he possesses at the time he authorizes or finances a related securities 
transaction?  
Leaving Obus aside, it may be that fund principals like Cohen can 
construct an information gathering and trading operation that relies on the willful 
blindness of the principals, enabling them to avoid insider trading liability as 
tippees.  Willful blindness is addressed under the criminal law doctrine of 
conscious avoidance, which may support a conviction on the basis of willful 
misconduct.36  The applicable standard comes from a 2011 Supreme Court case, 
Global-Tech Appliances Inc. v. SEB S.A.37  In that case, the Court articulates a 
standard (based on appellate court decisions) that has two component parts and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (2012) (making it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”). 
33 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977).  The Santa Fe Court, in a decision that 
followed Ernst & Ernst by just a year (and cited to Ernst & Ernst), was quite explicit on this point: 
The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any 
conduct not involving manipulation or deception.  Nor have we been cited to 
any evidence in the legislative history that would support a departure from the 
language of the statute.  “When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of 
manipulation and deception, . . . and when its history reflects no more 
expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute.” 
Id. (footnote and citation omitted). 
34 See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654-55 (1997) (describing this “deception through 
nondisclosure”). 
35 See generally Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473. 
36 See, e.g., United States v. Goffer, 721 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2013). 
37 Global-Tech Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2070-71 (2011). 
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clarifies that, under the standard, negligent or reckless conduct is insufficient to 
support liability. 
While the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful 
blindness in slightly different ways, all appear to agree on two 
basic requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively believe 
that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the 
defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that 
fact.  We think these requirements give willful blindness an 
appropriately limited scope that surpasses recklessness and 
negligence.  Under this formulation, a willfully blind defendant is 
one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high 
probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have 
actually known the critical facts.  By contrast, a reckless defendant 
is one who merely knows of a substantial and unjustified risk of 
such wrongdoing, and a negligent defendant is one who should 
have known of a similar risk but, in fact, did not[.]38 
Although insider trading liability may be civil or criminal in nature, the scienter 
requirement, which exists in both civil and criminal claims, relies on intentional 
behavior.39  Accordingly, the willful blindness doctrine may be applied by a court 
in insider trading actions alleging that a tippee should have known of the germane 
breach of duty.40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Id. (footnote and citations omitted).  In Global-Tech, the Court explained the willful blindness 
doctrine as follows: 
The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal law.  Many 
criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, 
and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants 
cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves 
from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the 
circumstances.  The traditional rationale for this doctrine is that defendants 
who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those who have actual 
knowledge.  It is also said that persons who know enough to blind themselves 
to direct proof of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those facts. 
Id. at 2068-69 (citation omitted). 
39 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 216 (1976) (Blackmun, J. and Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  
40 A recent criminal insider trading case, citing to Obus, makes this point.  See United States v. 
Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[W]here appropriate . . . , the Government 
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In the event that the willful blindness doctrine is applied in the insider 
trading context (and perhaps even under other doctrines used to address when a 
tippee should have known of a relevant breach of duty), the court will have to 
address the circumstances under which an alleged violator “subjectively believe[s] 
that there is a high probability that a fact exists.”41  In other words, the court will 
have to assess the attributes of the factual context that may constitute the 
requisite subjective belief of the tippee that material nonpublic information has 
been received from an informant who has breached a duty of trust and 
confidence.42  Among these attributes are the professional and personal 
background of the tippee, the type of information received, and the size and 
nature of the operations of the securities trading firm.  Even assuming a court 
finds the required subjective belief, the court must then go on to find that the 
tippee has taken “deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact”43—the fact that 
material nonpublic information has been received from an informant who has 
breached a duty of trust and confidence.  In short, these elements may be difficult 
for public and private enforcement agents to prove.  And the relevant facts may 
be easy to manipulate to the advantage of putative tippees. 
Most would be surprised (if not scandalized) to learn that existing U.S. law 
may allow individuals to structure a securities trading businesses in a manner that 
shields them from individual, personal liability.  To some extent, this (perhaps 
undesirable) result reflects the circumstances and policies at play in Dirks, a 
Supreme Court decision made in a different era—an era that preceded the 
information superhighway of today—applying insider trading law to an unusual 
set of facts (involving disclosure of fraudulent conduct within a corporation by a 
former officer and current employees of that corporation).  The tippee liability 
rule in Dirks derives in large part from a desire to protect the entrepreneurial hunt 
for information in connection with securities trading transactions.44  In 
formulating this rule, the Court explicitly credited this policy objective.	  
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person 
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an 
insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is entitled to a ‘willful blindness’ or ‘conscious avoidance’ instruction to the jury on the issue of 
such knowledge.”). 
41 See Global-Tech, 131 S.Ct. at 2070. 
42 See id. 
43 Id. 
44 See Dirks v. United States, 463 U.S. 658-59 (1983); see also Langevoort, supra note 28, at 433 
(noting and critiquing this asserted policy). 
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role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is 
necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.  It is 
commonplace for analysts to “ferret out and analyze information,” 
and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate 
officers and others who are insiders.  And information that the 
analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the 
market worth of a corporation’s securities.  The analyst’s 
judgment in this respect is made available in market letters or 
otherwise to clients of the firm.  It is the nature of this type of 
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such 
information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the 
corporation’s stockholders or the public generally.45 
Although this reasoning lays the foundation for the rule in Dirks, the law 
on selective disclosure to analysts has changed since Dirks was decided.  In 2000, 
the SEC adopted Regulation FD, which requires issuers to publicly disclose any 
material nonpublic information conveyed to market professionals and other 
specified people.46  This required public disclosure must be simultaneous for 
intentional disclosures and prompt for unintentional disclosures.47   
Regulation FD specifically addresses the potential interactions of its 
provisions with insider trading and other laws and regulations applicable to 
securities trading by corporate insiders.  As a general matter, Regulation FD is not 
intended to change existing fraud and other misstatements liability or reporting 
requirements.  For example, Regulation FD provides that “[n]o failure to make a 
public disclosure required solely by § 243.100 shall be deemed to be a violation of 
Rule 10b-5 (17 CFR 240.10b-5) under the Securities Exchange Act.”48 In addition, 
compliance with reporting obligations under the 1934 Act and public information 
requirements in Rule 144 under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, are not 
affected by the failure to comply with the public disclosure requirements of 
Regulation FD.49  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). 
46 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2013). 
47 Id. 
48 17 C.F.R. § 243.102. 
49 See 17 C.F.R. § 243.103. 
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Notwithstanding the lack of a direct liability connection between 
Regulation FD and insider trading liability, the adoption of Regulation FD and 
the practices engendered by it over the past thirteen years have changed the 
nature of an analyst’s work and curbed the information entrepreneurialism of 
market intermediaries.  In light of this sea change (if it represents one) and the 
prevalence of expert network insider trading, is it right to allow securities trading 
firm principals like Cohen to avoid liability because they can plausibly deny the 
origins of material nonpublic information that underlies securities trading 
undertaken at their behest or for their financial benefit?  The SAC prosecution 
and Cohen enforcement proceedings present an opportunity for us to take a new 
look at this old question and discuss where the law of insider trading should be—
and why—as a matter of policy.  If insider trading regulation and liability is to 
have any coherence in an era of expert networks, we must address and resolve 
this question. 
 
